In this paper we introduce a fundamental model under which we will price contingent capital notes using conic finance techniques. The model is based on more realistic balance-sheet models recognizing the fact that asset and liabilities are both risky and have to be treated differently taking into account bid and ask prices in a prudent fashion. The underlying theory makes use of conic finance which is based on the concept of acceptability and distorted expectations. We recall the theory and give a brief overview of the related literature. Next, we discuss and propose some potential funded and unfunded contingent capital notes. Traditionally, the conversion trigger of contingent capital notes is in terms of the Core-Tier 1 ratio. We argue that this ratio is maybe not optimal, certainly when taking into account the presence of risky liabilities. As an alternative we introduce triggers based on capital shortfall. The pricing of seven variations of funded as well as unfunded notes is overviewed. We further investigate the effect of the dilution factor and the grace factor. In an appendix we show conic balance sheets including contingent capital instruments.
instrument (derivative), one ensures that in times of heavily distressed markets, corporations in trouble automatically are provided with fresh capital. A contingent capital note is by contract triggered when a certain capital related indicator, like for example the Core-Tier 1 ratio, falls below a certain level (say 5%). At that point in time for example new capital comes in, in return for equity according to a rule fixed when the contract is struck; some deals don't bring in equity but cancel some outstanding debt. Many variations are possible. The deal is made upfront and one avoids the need of going to the capital markets in such distressed situations, when it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to raise new funds.
Contingent capital has not come out of the blue. The G20 announcement in September 2009 stated specifically that they would be examining contingent capital and comparable instruments. In November 2009, Lloyds Banking Group issued a Lower Tier 2 hybrid capital instrument called Enhanced Capital Notes. These include a contingent capital feature and will reportedly convert into ordinary shares if Lloyds' published consolidated Core-Tier 1 ratio falls below 5%. This instrument will not be included in the regulatory Core-Tier 1 ratio until a conversion occurs. The conversion price is based on LBG's stock price at the issue date. Mid 2010 also Rabobank has issued a contingent core note and in October 2010, a Swiss government-appointed panel, proposed the first capital surcharge on too-big-to-fail banks. Switzerland's biggest banks should hold total capital equal to at least 19% of their assets. By 2019, the lenders need to have a common equity ratio of at least 10% and the rest in contingent capital. One expects Swiss banks to issue about SFR 72 billion in contingent capital to meet these new standards.
There is not much literature about these new products. A pioneering paper proposing such securities is by Flannery [11] . In [13], a form of contingent capital that converts from debt to equity if two conditions are met is proposed. To convert, the firm's stock price and the level of a financial index should be both simultaneously below their respective trigger values. Such a structure gives "protection" during a crisis, when all are performing badly, but during normal times permits a badly performing bank to go bankrupt.
Acharya et al. [23] have suggested that while contingent capital does restore some market discipline, both contingent capital and equity capital may have incentives to take excessive risks at the expense of taxpayer money. Schoutens [22] has pointed out several potential problems that could arise near the trigger level, were one can anticipate the volatility will be high. Triggering one bank, can lead to speculation on other banks. Timing of publishing capital ratios should be synchronized. If one bank reveals it is triggered this increases the triggering probability of other financial players dramatically in a systematic crisis due to high correlation. Further, the most straightforward way coconut holders could hedge against potentially being triggered and baring some heavy losses, is shorting the underlying stock. This could bring stock prices even down further and hence the company actually closer to the trigger level; a kind of death-spiral effect could arise. Furthermore, if coconuts are mainly held by the financial players, the triggering of a few will lead to potential losses on the balance sheets of the others, who held these. This could lead to a domino effect of triggering either new coconuts or defaults. Also some critical analysis is made in [12] on the mechanics of their operation and the market implications. Bond et al. [1] have argued that if agents were to use market prices when taking corrective actions, prices will adjust to reflect such a use and may become potentially less revealing. Maes and Schoutens in [21] discuss issues of counterparty risk, effectiveness, moral hazard, contagion and systemic risk, as well as death-spiral issues arising from the hedging strategies of the investors.
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